Firms in controversial industries such as tobacco, alcohol, gambling, weapon, and nuclear power suffer organizational legitimacy problems. These firms, therefore, adopt various strategies to acquire legitimacy. Drawing on institutional theory, we conceptualize the top management team gender diversity as a legitimacy-seeking strategy and examines how a firm’s belonging to a controversial sector affects TMT gender diversity. Based on a cross-country sample of 1542 firms operating in controversial industries from 34 countries and control sample with another set of 1542 similar-sized firms (...) from non-controversial industries, the empirical evidence shows that belonging to a controversial industry exerts a positive impact on TMT gender diversity. The effect of industry belonging on TMT gender diversity is positively moderated by institutional gender parity and a low level of corruption. It indicates that institutional factors act as emancipative forces that foster women's empowerment. Taken together, our results for moderating variables highlight the role of institutional characteristics in supporting women empowerment initiatives. (shrink)

The aim of this work focuses on the relationship among the Dark Triad, perceptions of organizational politics, political skills, and counterproductive work behavior. This study empirically tests the mediating role of perceptions of organizational politics in the relationship between the Dark Triad and counterproductive work behavior. Furthermore, the study investigates the moderating role of political skills in strengthening the link between the Dark Triad and the perceptions of organizational politics. A sample of 149 participants was randomly selected. To analyze the (...) data of the present work, we employed a structural equation model using partial least square and PROCESS. From empirical findings, we imply an inference that perception of organizational politics partially mediates the Dark Triad's influence on the counterproductive work behavior. Moreover, the results identify the moderating role of political skills in strengthening the link between the Dark Triad and the perceptions of organizational politics. Empirical findings suggest important policy implications for the hospitality industry. (shrink)

A passive brain–computer interface based upon functional near-infrared spectroscopy brain signals is used for earlier detection of human drowsiness during driving tasks. This BCI modality acquired hemodynamic signals of 13 healthy subjects from the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the brain. Drowsiness activity is recorded using a continuous-wave fNIRS system and eight channels over the right DPFC. During the experiment, sleep-deprived subjects drove a vehicle in a driving simulator while their cerebral oxygen regulation state was continuously measured. Vector phase analysis (...) was used as a classifier to detect drowsiness state along with sleep stage-based threshold criteria. Extensive training and testing with various feature sets and classifiers are done to justify the adaptation of threshold criteria for any subject without requiring recalibration. Three statistical features along with six VPA features were used. The average accuracies for the five classifiers are 90.9% for discriminant analysis, 92.5% for support vector machines, 92.3% for nearest neighbors, 92.4% for both decision trees, and ensembles over all subjects’ data. Trajectory slopes of CORE vector magnitude and angle: m and m are the best-performing features, along with ensemble classifier with the highest accuracy of 95.3% and minimum computation time of 40 ms. The statistical significance of the results is validated with a p-value of less than 0.05. The proposed passive BCI scheme demonstrates a promising technique for online drowsiness detection using VPA along with sleep stage classification. (shrink)

Purpose: The purposes of this study were to assess the knowledge, attitude, and practice of radiologists and paramedics regarding accident and emergency preparedness in hospitals in the southern region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and how to improve their role. Materials and methods: This was a descriptive, cross‑sectional online survey that was carried out among radiologists and paramedics in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A self-structured, close-ended questionnaire that was administered that consisted of 19 questions was included. The questionnaire (...) validity and reliability were evaluated for vetting and remarks. The questions were circulated through Google Forms, and it was circulated among the study participants through online mode. The data were collected systematically, and SPSS Statistics version 26.0 was used for data analysis Results: There were 139 responses, (77 specialist's radiology and 62 paramedics) participated in the study through Google Forms. In the study group, 84 (61.4%) were know the main steps for emergency response in major emergencies (p-value 0.000). Among the 19 questions used to assess the KAP, 12 questions were significant with a p-value less than 0.05. More than 72.6% agree the Management must be adequately prepared when emergencies and accidents occur. The respondents’ attitude toward emergency preparedness was generally positiveو Only a minority, that is, 43 (30.9%) of the respondents think it is possible for cooperation between radiologists and paramedics to interpret emergency cases and develop treatment plans in the emergency department. Conclusion: The level of knowledge was satisfactory among the radiologists and paramedics with a neutral level of attitudes, practice and knowledge regarding disaster preparedness. Follow-up research is essential to maximize the preparedness of the accident and emergency department. (shrink)

Academic performance is among the several components of academic success. Many factors, including socioeconomic status, student temperament and motivation, peer and parental support influence academic performance. Our study aims to investigate the determinants of academic performance with emphasis on the role of parental styles in adolescent students in Peshawar Pakistan. A total of 456 students from 4 public and 4 private schools were interviewed. Academic performance was assessed based on self-reported grades in the latest internal examinations. Parenting styles were assessed (...) through the administration of the Parental bonding instrument. Regression analysis was conducted to assess the influence of socio-demographic factors and parenting styles on academic performance. Factors associated with and differences between “care” and “overprotection” scores of fathers and mothers were analyzed. Higher socio-economic status, father’s education level and higher care scores were independently associated with better academic performance in adolescent students. Affectionless control was the most common parenting style for fathers and mothers. When adapted by the father, it was also the only parenting style independently improving academic performance. Overall, mean “care” scores were higher for mothers and mean “overprotection” scores were higher for fathers. Parenting workshops and school activities emphasizing the involvement of mothers and fathers in the parenting of adolescent students might have a positive influence on their academic performance. Affectionless control may be associated with improved academics but the emotional and psychosocial effects of this style of parenting need to be investigated before recommendations are made. (shrink)

The present paper analyzes cultural attires and appearances of Marri and Bugti tribes in Balochistan to find out latent meanings attached to these artifacts. In doing so, the study uses Peirce’s framework of semiotics- an iconic perspective. The analysis has been carried out with the help of close reading of the cultural images and appearances. The results reveal underlying multi-meanings attached to these images and appearances. The findings reflect the richness and diversity of Marri and Bugti cultures and the invisible (...) representational meanings of these objects. This research endeavor may be helpful to promote pluralism, harmony and enhance intercultural awareness necessary for understanding cultural diversities within and across societies. More so, future researchers can explore cultural objects and appearances of Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtuns, Urdu speaking, and Saraiki people by applying various frameworks of semiotics. (shrink)

My intention in this paper is to reframe the practice of veiling as an embodied practice of self-development and self- transformation. I argue that practices like these cannot be handled by the choice/chance distinction relied on by those who would restrict religious minority accommodations. Embodied self- transformation necessarily means a change in personal identity and this means the religious believer cannot know if they will need religious accommodation when they begin their journey of piety. Even some luck egalitarians would find (...) leaning exclusively on preference and choice to find who should be burdened with paying the full costs of certain choices in one’s life too morally harsh to be justifiable. I end by briefly illustrating an alternative way to think about religious accommodation that does not rely on the choice/chance distinction. (shrink)

Some philosophers and historians of science have suggested that the meanings of scientific terms change in the course of the history of science in such a way that the comparison of successive theories becomes impossible. This claim of "incommensurability", usually associated with Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, has attracted attention for its relativist and anti-rationalist implications. It would seem to make the choice between two theories into a random affair, not one of direct comparison. ;The principal attempts to defeat this (...) claim are based either on Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference, first proposed as an account of the reference of proper names, or on Donald Davidson's general argument that all languages are inter-translatable. However, the former is inappropriate as a reply to incommensurability and the latter must be modified before it can serve as a procedure for theory-comparison. After looking at these two replies in detail, the dissertation proposes a method for comparing theories. ;Davidson's argument against incommensurability is adapted so that his interpretive method can serve as the basis of a procedure for comparing scientific theories. Certain constraints on interpretation are spelt out in order to arrive at a unique way of isolating the agreements and disagreements among theories. The main attraction of the interpretive approach is that it consists of a descriptional account of meaning which is also holistic. That is to say, it identifies a term from one theory with a term from another on the basis of the overlap between the two theories, but without relying on the analytic-synthetic distinction. ;A number of case studies are used to demonstrate how theories can be compared and their concepts matched up. One of the consequences of this approach is that transitivity in the translation of concepts will generally break down. But that does not force an anti-realist position in the philosophy of science. To justify this claim, a discussion of scientific taxonomy is undertaken and criticisms are made of the essentialist conception of natural kinds. (shrink)

We propose a first order equation from which the Schrodinger equation can be derived. Matrices that obey certain properties are introduced for this purpose. We start by constructing the solutions of this equation in one dimension and solve the problem of electron scattering from a step potential. We show that the sum of the spin up and down, reflection and transmission coefficients, is equal to the quantum mechanical results for this problem. Furthermore, we present a three dimensional version of the (...) equation which can be used to derive the Schrodinger equation in 3D. (shrink)

The Quest for Happiness Is a Universal Fact. It is a scientific fact, which means we can measure happiness, we can assess it, and we can devise strategies to make ourselves happy and fulfilled human beings. So says Professor Gad Saad, the author of the sensational bestseller The Parasitic Mind and the irrepressible host of The Saad Truth podcast. In this provocative, entertaining, and life-changing new book, he roams through the scientific studies, culls the wisdom of ancient philosophy (...) and religion, and draws on his extraordinary personal experience as a refugee from war-torn Lebanon turned academic celebrity. (shrink)

The high prevalence of aggression, anxiety and stress symptoms among team members in the organisation, while acquisition of task is alarming causation of adjustment disorder influences on team embeddedness, is the subject of this study. The ontogenesis of psychosocial adjustment disorder in any employees is not palingenetic, this is exact reproduction of psychosocial factors (PSF) which develops at workplace The most important strategy for productivity improvement is based on the fact that human productivity, both positive and negative, is determined by (...) the attitudes of all those who work in the enterprise and gap surfaced between teamwork and competence development particularly with regard to managing individualism within organisation and specifically individualistic approach, organisational justice, productivity management and psychosocial support. We strongly feel that there is a need to reexamine organisational team credentials and possible strong influences on individual’s psychosocial adjustment disorders. Findings suggest psychosocial adjustment factors are significantly correlated with psychosocial disorders (PSDs). (shrink)

As ever more advanced digital systems are created, it becomes increasingly likely that some of these systems will be digital minds, i.e. digital subjects of experience. With digital minds comes the risk of digital suffering. The problem of digital suffering is that of mitigating this risk. We argue that the problem of digital suffering is a high stakes moral problem and that formidable epistemic obstacles stand in the way of solving it. We then propose a strategy for solving it: Access (...) Monitor Prevent (AMP). AMP uses a ‘dancing qualia’ argument to link the functional states of certain digital systems to their experiences—this yields epistemic access to digital minds. With that access, we can prevent digital suffering by only creating advanced digital systems that we have such access to, monitoring their functional profiles, and preventing them from entering states with functional markers of suffering. After introducing and motivating AMP, we confront limitations it faces and identify some options for overcoming them. We argue that AMP fits especially well with—and so provides a moral reason to prioritize—one approach to creating such systems: whole brain emulation. We also contend that taking other paths to digital minds would be morally risky. (shrink)

Whether AI systems could be conscious is often thought to turn on whether consciousness is closely linked to biology. Roughly, the thought is: if consciousness is closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is impossible; and if consciousness is not closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is possible—or, at any rate, it’s more likely to be possible. A clearer specification of the kind of link between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness would facilitate (...) inquiry into the prospects for AI consciousness. After motivating desiderata that such a specification should meet, I argue that proposed views about the relationship between consciousness and biology tend not to capture such a crucial link. In addition, I offer a thesis that does capture the link: the biological requirement according to which being conscious at least nomically requires having biological states. (shrink)

Some physical theories predict that almost all brains in the universe are Boltzmann brains, i.e. short-lived disembodied brains that are accidentally assembled as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. Physicists and philosophers of physics widely regard this proliferation as unacceptable, and so take its prediction as a basis for rejecting these theories. But the putatively unacceptable consequences of this prediction follow only given certain philosophical assumptions. This paper develops a strategy for shielding physical theorizing from the threat of Boltzmann (...) brains. The strategy appeals to a form of phenomenal externalism about the physical basis of consciousness. Given that form of phenomenal externalism, the proliferation of Boltzmann brains turns out to be benign. While the strategy faces a psychophysical fine-tuning problem, it both alleviates cosmological fine-tuning concerns that attend physics-based solutions to Boltzmann brain problems and pays explanatory dividends in connection with time’s arrow. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that discovering that our universe is fine-tuned should make us more confident that other universes exist. My defense exploits a distinction between ideal and non-ideal evidential support. I use that distinction in concert with a simple model to disarm the most influential objection—the this-universe objection—to the view that fine-tuning supports the existence of other universes. However, the simple model fails to capture some important features of our epistemic situation with respect to fine-tuning. To capture these (...) features, I introduce a more sophisticated model. I then use the more sophisticated model to show that, even once those complicating factors are taken into account, fine-tuning should boost our confidence in the existence of other universes. (shrink)

This paper provides a contemporary introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are studied within the emerging field of digital minds research. We explore the potential for AI systems to have mental states. Questions that we address include whether AI systems can be phenomenally conscious and whether they can have propositional attitudes such as belief and desire. We also consider how digital minds might persist through time in a manner akin to how humans have personal (...) identity through time. Along the way, we highlight methodological issues raised by these questions and examine how these questions relate to traditional issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. We conclude by highlighting issues in this area that are ripe for further investigation. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences are non-physical states that exist alongside physical states. Dualism leads to the postulation of psychophysical laws that generate experiences by operating on certain sorts of physical states. What sorts of physical states? To the limited extent that dualists have addressed this question, they have tended to favor a brain-based approach that locates the physical basis of experience in the head. In contrast, this paper develops an argument for a form of dualism on which experience has a (...) physical basis that reaches out into the world. Specifically, the argument uses a puzzle about spatial experience to support a theory I call _tracking dualism_. On tracking dualism, a psychophysical law generates experiences by operating on complex physical states that involve both brain states and tracking relations that they bear to features of the environment. To develop the argument, I discuss tracking dualism alongside its more familiar physicalist counterpart, the tracking intentionalist theory associated with Dretske, Lycan, and Tye. I conclude by outlining a tracking dualist research agenda. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as (...) a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call delegatory dualism—experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states. (shrink)

On some cosmological models, we’re cosmically early: we arrived roughly 14 billion years after the Big Bang in a universe that will evidently remain conducive to the emergence of intelligent observers for trillions of years. Why are we so early? I’ll survey two broad classes of responses: large-world responses that turn on reality being much larger than on standard single-universe hypotheses and small-world responses that are compatible with the world being no larger than such hypotheses take it to be. One (...) upshot will be that cosmic earliness suggests a diverse range of large-world explanations. In contrast, it turns out to be difficult to account for cosmic earliness while steering clear of large-world commitments. I conclude with some reflections on why our time of arrival seems thoroughly entangled with our world’s size. (shrink)

Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. I favour an interactionist dualist version of realizationism on which experiences are non-physical states that non-redundantly cause problem judgments. This view is subject to the challenges of specifying laws that would enable experiences to cause problem judgments and of explaining why (...) it's not a lucky coincidence that experiences' causal and rational powers converge on problem judgments. I propose a strategy for solving the meta-problem and meeting these challenges. According to it, a fundamental teleological law operates on normative features of experiences in ways that bias experiences towards causing effects that they rationalize, including problem judgments. I conclude by applying the strategy to other luck-avoidance challenges. (shrink)

Experiences tend to be followed by states for which they provide normative reasons. Such harmonious correlations cry out for explanation. Theories that answer or diminish these cries thereby achieve an advantage over theories that do neither. I argue that the main lines of response to these cries that are available to biological theorists—theorists who hold (roughly) that conscious subjects are generally biological entities—are problematic. And I argue that panpsychism—which holds (roughly) that conscious subjects are ubiquitous in nature—provides an attractive response (...) to these explanatory cries. Taken together, these considerations underwrite a kind of ‘psychophysical fine-tuning’ argument in support of panpsychism, one that is reminiscent of cosmological fine-tuning arguments in favor of multiverse hypotheses. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness seems fragmented: phenomenal states seem to belong to many families, where members of each family just resemble members of that family. This paper argues that phenomenal fragmentation poses a neglected problem for consciousness fundamentalism. Consciousness fundamentalism holds that some phenomenal states are fundamental and that they ground any non-fundamental phenomenal states. While consciousness fundamentalism is not a familiar view, it encompasses familiar forms of dualism, panpsychism, and idealism. Roughly, the problem is: on consciousness fundamentalism, phenomenal fragmentation leads to (...) a radical and highly objectionable expansion of our fundamental ontology. After developing the phenomenal fragmentation problem, I survey candidate solutions and illustrate how the problem offers a fruitful constraint on theorizing about consciousness for consciousness fundamentalists. (shrink)

Many philosophers and scientists take cosmological fine-tuning—roughly the fact that our universe would have been devoid of life if it had had slightly different cosmological parameters—to point to the existence of a designer or multiverse. Planetary fine-tuning—roughly the fact that our planet would have been devoid of life if it had slightly different intrinsic characteristics or relations to other objects in the solar system—points to the existence of many planets. It may seem that since astronomy independently confirms the existence of (...) many planets, planetary fine-tuning is of less philosophical interest than cosmological fine-tuning. This paper shows that any such appearance is illusory by defending four arguments for the conclusion that our planetary fine-tuning evidence supports the existence of a multiverse. (shrink)

To defend the physical reducibility of phenomenology in our world, reductive physicalists have long guarded the realm of metaphysical possibility: for decades now, they have relentlessly endeavored to prevent zombies (physical duplicates of actual conscious individuals) from entering modal space. In contrast, reductive physicalists have tended to adopt an open modal borders policy towards aliens, i.e. individuals with phenomenal properties foreign to our world. On the face of it, aliens—and, even aliens with physically irreducible phenomenology—pose no threat: after all, reductive (...) physicalism says nothing about the nature of uninstantiated phenomenal properties. However, I argue that an alien threat looms. The trouble, for reductive physicalists, is that upon granting aliens entry into modal space, phenomenal commonalities between aliens and actual individuals arise and resist physical reduction at our world. This is the alien phenomenology problem. It could be solved by restricting access to modal space. Or by limiting what aliens can do once inside. However, these solutions harbor hidden costs for reductive physicalists, ones they should not be eager to pay. A better bargain, I suggest, would be for reductive physicalists to retreat to quasi-reductive physicalism, a form of grounding physicalism on which only some instantiated phenomenal properties are physically reducible. For reductive physicalists, this fallback position has much to offer. It enjoys reductive physicalism’s motivations. It reconciles the physical reducibility of some phenomenology in our world with the possibility of aliens. And it enables an alien-assisted defense against zombies. (shrink)

Dualism holds that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing (...) out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy. (shrink)

This paper introduces and clarifies an intuitive yet neglected hypothesis: the attention-welfare link, according to which (roughly) the degree of attention directed towards valenced experiences modulates the degree to which these experiences are good or bad for their subject. We show that the link is supported by reflection on cases and that it is best understood in terms of phenomenal attention rather than functional attention. To conclude, we describe three applications of the link: first, it provides grounds for rejecting popular (...) sentientist views of welfare; second, it sheds light on how to understand the resonance constraint; and third, it points towards a previously-unappreciated path to individuals with super-human welfare capacity. (shrink)

Respect for Autonomy has been a mainstay of medical ethics since its enshrinement as one of the four principles of biomedical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress’ in the late 1970s. This paper traces the development of this modern concept from Antiquity to the present day, paying attention to its Enlightenment origins in Kant and Rousseau. The rapid C20th developments of bioethics and RFA are then considered in the context of the post-war period and American socio-political thought. The validity and utility (...) of the RFA are discussed in light of this philosophical-historical account. It is concluded that it is not necessary to embrace an ethic of autonomy in order to guard patients from coercion or paternalism, and that, on the contrary, the dominance of autonomy threatens to undermine those very things which have helped doctors come to view and respect their patients as persons. (shrink)

Interactionists hold that minds are non-physical objects that interact with brains. The neural discernment problem for interactionism is that of explaining how non-physical minds produce behavior and cognition by exercising different causal powers over physiologically similar neurons. This paper sharpens the neural discernment problem and proposes two interactionist models of mind-brain interaction that solve it. One model avoids overdetermination while the other respects the causal closure of the physical domain.

This paper argues for granular permissivism, roughly the view that evidence is sometimes permissive between doxastic attitudes at different levels of grain. The argument identifies three sources of rational slack between granularly differing doxastic states: doxastic tidiness, safety, and evidential responsiveness. After arguing for granular permissivism and contrasting it with a more familiar, Jamesian form of permissivism, I show how granular permissivism offers an escape from some arguments against permissivism. I conclude by drawing out implications from granular permissivism for questions (...) about the value of rationality and rational constraints on deference. (shrink)

A causal argument for physicalism is widely held to pose a problem for dualism. This view has an unobvious presupposition, namely that the causal closure of the physical has a special sort of ground. The requisite sort of ground must distinguish the causal argument for physicalism from many defective causal arguments. On behalf of physicalists, I develop an account of the ground for the causal closure of the physical, thereby putting the causal argument for physicalism back in the business of (...) causally problematizing dualism. One consequence of my account is that physicalists can pose a causal problem for dualism using a much weaker closure premise than is generally assumed. (shrink)

This report explores interactions between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. It offers a tour of the surrounding theoretical terrain and brings together disparate literatures that bear on the topic.

Recent declarations of the end of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom, especially since the Covid-19 pandemic, are underpinned by diffuse and unstructured understandings of the neoliberal state. We argue that state intervention is both necessary and unavoidable under neoliberalism. This article shows that the ‘market-based’ reforms and the ‘rollback of the state’ that overtly characterise neoliberalism are heavily reliant upon public policy and entail an ongoing role for state intervention both over time and across economic sectors. Using sectoral case studies (...) of housing and water from within the United Kingdom, we demonstrate, through a tight analytical framing of both financialisation and commodification, the variegated though crucial role of the neoliberal state in restructuring provision to facilitate financialised accumulation and their transformations in response to the contradictions, dysfunctions and limitations of neoliberalised social reproduction. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 374-377.

Florence Ashley has argued that requiring patients with gender dysphoria to undergo an assessment and referral from a mental health professional before undergoing hormone replacement therapy (HRT) is unethical and may represent an unconscious hostility towards transgender people. We respond, first, by showing that Ashley has conflated the self-reporting of symptoms with self-diagnosis, and that this is not consistent with the standard model of informed consent to medical treatment. Second, we note that the model of informed consent involved in cosmetic (...) surgery resembles the model Ashley defends, and that psychological assessment and referral is recognised as an important aspect of such a model. Third, we suggest that the increased prevalence of psychiatric morbidity in the transgender population arguably supports the requirement of assessment and referral from a mental health professional prior to undergoing HRT. (shrink)

Why "cultivating contingency" is essential to being free, including an argument for public bodies selected via sortition (random selection).

Gauge invariance of a manifestly covariant relativistic quantum theory with evolution according to an invariant time τ implies the existence of five gauge compensation fields, which we shall call pre-Maxwell fields. A Lagrangian which generates the equations of motion for the matter field (coinciding with the Schrödinger type quantum evolution equation) as well as equations, on a five-dimensional manifold, for the gauge fields, is written. It is shown that τ integration of the equations for the pre-Maxwell fields results in the (...) usual Maxwell equations with conserved current source. The analog of the O (3, 1) symmetry of the usual Maxwell theory is found to be O (3, 2) or O (4, 1), depending on the space-time Fourier spectrum of the field. We argue that the structure that is relevant to the description of radiation in interaction with matter evolving in a timelike sense is that of O (3, 2). The noncovariant form of the field equations is given; there are two fields of electric type and one (divergenceless) magnetic type field. The Noether currents are studied, and some remarks are made on second quantization. (shrink)

I explore two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality: spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. Roughly, spatial functionalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties are those playing a certain causal role in producing spatial experience while spatial presentationalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties include those presented in spatial experience. I argue that each view, in its own way, leads to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism: whereas spatial functionalism leads to primitivism about phenomenal representation, spatial presentationalism (...) leads to primitivism about spatial properties. I conclude by discussing how to adjudicate between spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. (shrink)

In this article I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward earlier events: other things equal, we should prefer for good events to occur earlier and disprefer for bad events to occur earlier. The argument contends that we should accord at least some credence—if only a small one—to a theoretical package featuring the growing block theory of time and that this package generates a presumptive bias toward earlier events. Rival theoretical packages are considered. Under reasonable allocations of (...) credence to them, the presumptive bias escapes defeat. The argument has several corollaries: other things equal, we should be biased toward the past over the future, the further past over the nearer past, and the nearer future over the further future. (shrink)

Though not myself a physicalist, I develop a new argument against antiphysicalist positions that are motivated by zombie arguments. I first identify four general features of phenomenal states that are candidates for non-physical types; these are used to generate different types of zombie. I distinguish two antiphysicalist positions: strict dualism, which posits exactly one general non-physical type, and pluralism, which posits more than one such type. It turns out that zombie arguments threaten strict dualism and some pluralist positions as much (...) as they threaten physicalism—indeed, more so, since such positions need zombies to motivate them as alternatives to physicalism—and that the only pluralist position that escapes zombie arguments has a radically inflated ontology. (shrink)

This paper argues that healthcare aims at the good of health, that this pursuit of the good necessitates conscience, and that conscience is required in every practical judgement, including clinical...

Debate persists over the place of conscience in medicine. Some argue for the complete exclusion of conscientious objection, while others claim an absolute right of refusal. This paper proposes that claims of conscientious objection can and should be permitted if they concern kinds of actions which fall outside of the normative standard of medicine, which is the pursuit of health. Medical practice which meets this criterion we call medicine qua medicine. If conscientious refusal concerns something consonant with the health-restoring aims (...) of medicine, it entails a desertion of professional duty. If, however, it relates to something other than medicine qua medicine, it can rightly be refused. It thus becomes possible to test instances of conscientious objection to determine their validity, and thereby conserve both the principle of conscientious objection and define its scope. This test of conscience prevents arbitrary discrimination, and preserves doctors’ agency. It is a theoretical razor rooted in the pra... (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences and physical states are distinct in that neither sort of state is identical with or grounded in the other. Cognitive phenomenal realism holds that cognitive experiences are irreducible to sensory experiences. While dualism and cognitive phenomenal realism are logically orthogonal and usually discussed separately, I argue that dualism’s plausibility is sensitive to whether cognitive phenomenal realism is true. In particular, I argue that if cognitive phenomenal realism is true, then it bolsters the case for dualism via (...) a cognitive knowledge argument that has several advantages over the standard sensory knowledge argument. (shrink)

In her paper ‘Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection’, Minerva rightly identifies cosmetic surgery as an interesting test case for the question of conscientious objection in medicine. Her treatment of this important subject, however, seems problematic. It is argued that Minerva's suggestion that a doctor has a prima facie duty to satisfy patient preferences even against his better clinical judgment, which we call Patient Preference Absolutism, must be regarded with scepticism. This is because it overlooks an important distinction regarding autonomy's meaning (...) and place in clinical practice, and it makes obsolete the important concepts of expert clinical judgment and beneficence. Finally, we discuss two ideas which emerge from consideration of cosmetic surgery in relation to conscientious objection. These are the possible analogy between clinical judgment and conscientious objection, and the possible role the goals of medicine can play in defining the scope of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Räsänen has attempted to make a moral case for permitting some people to change their legal age: if someone considers that their chronological age does not correspond to their emotional age or biological age, and they face age-based discrimination as a result, they may change the legal record of their age. This response considers some of the problems with Räsänen’s paper, including its reliance on equivocation. It concludes that what is billed as a moral argument turns out to be a (...) conflicted case for deception which relies on a nihilistic outlook on reality. (shrink)

The form of things is not their essence, but only their presentation, a deadly shorthand which necessarily erases significant differences and so should be used with the utmost care and discretion.

Wallenhorst and Saad's contribution rereads the figure of the "wise woman" in "Fate and Character" far more ambivalently than as a simple charlatan who reproduces the judgments of the dominant order. While Benjamin casts her divinations as complicit with a naturalized regime of fate, Wallenhorst and Saad argue that her "simple technique" can also unsettle fatalism and issue "momentarily anti-dialectical" imperatives in a manner that opens up spaces of collective agency and the pleasure of avengement. Reframing her through (...) associations with midwifery, militancy, and rupture, they propose that the wise woman's destructive judgments may catalyze fatelessness—transforming guilt into rage and enabling moments of political or psychic breaks with an order which is not to be accepted as given. (shrink)

The chief motivation for epiphenomenalist dualism is its promise to solve dualism’s causal exclusion problem without inducing causal overdetermination or violations of the causal closure of the physical. This paper argues that epiphenomenalist dualism is itself susceptible to an exclusion problem. The problem exploits symmetries of determination and influence generated by a wide class of physical theories. Further, I argue that there is an interference effect between solving epiphenomenalist dualism's exclusion problem and using epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the (...) causal exclusion problem. What emerges is an overlooked, empirically-motivated challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism. (shrink)